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Abstract
Human social hierarchy has the unique characteristic of ex-
isting in two forms. Firstly, as an informal hierarchy where
leaders and followers are implicitly defined by their personal
characteristics, and secondly, as an institutional hierarchy
where leaders and followers are explicitly appointed by group
decision. Although both forms can reduce the time spent
in organising collective tasks, institutional hierarchy imposes
additional costs. It is therefore natural to question why it
emerges at all. The key difference lies in the fact that insti-
tutions can create hierarchy with only a single leader, which
is unlikely to occur in unregulated informal hierarchy. To in-
vestigate if this difference can affect group decision-making
and explain the evolution of institutional hierarchy, we first
build an opinion-formation model that simulates group deci-
sion making. We show that in comparison to informal hierar-
chy, a single-leader hierarchy reduces (i) the time a group
spends to reach consensus, (ii) the variation in consensus
time, and (iii) the rate of increase in consensus time as group
size increases. We then use this model to simulate the cost of
organising a collective action which produces resources, and
integrate this into an evolutionary model where individuals
can choose between informal or institutional hierarchy. Our
results demonstrate that groups evolve preferences towards
institutional hierarchy, despite the cost of creating an institu-
tion, as it provides a greater organisational advantage which
is less affected by group size and inequality.
Introduction
Why do humans choose their leaders? A meta-analysis of
sixty independent studies shows that leadership effective-
ness is not always correlated with leadership emergence
(Judge et al., 2002). In other words, groups sometimes
choose incompetent individuals as leaders. For instance,
experiments on leader choice showed that “evaluations of
beauty explain success in real elections better than evalua-
tions of competence, intelligence, likability, or trustworthi-
ness” (Berggren et al., 2010). Yet, despite these risks, most
modern human hierarchies spend time and resources to ex-
plicitly choose leaders, even if efficient leaders are already
designated by their characteristics and skills.
Social organisation plays an important role in the nu-
merous decisions that groups take to efficiently coordinate
(Calvert, 1992). In social hierarchies, only a minority of in-
dividuals (leaders) are involved in the decision-making pro-
cess, while the majority of individuals (followers) have lim-
ited influence on collective decisions. At the opposite ex-
treme, ancient human hunter-gatherer societies were marked
by a relatively equal input from all individuals in group de-
cisions (Boehm, 2001). The transition between these two
extremes is believed to have been initiated by the advent
of agriculture, which created a surplus of resources and in-
creased group size (Bocquet-Appel, 2011). In return, larger
groups produced more resources thanks to division of labour
and specialisation (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2001). On the
flip side, the need for greater numbers of individuals to co-
ordinate their actions is translated into higher costs of organ-
isation (Calvert, 1992). Hierarchy appears as an adaptation
to reduce these costs of organisation (Van Vugt et al., 2011),
and in particular, to address the increase in cost of organisa-
tion as a group grows, i.e. scalar stress (Johnson, 1982). In
large societies, the benefits created by hierarchy counterbal-
ance the cost of any resulting inequality, eventually leading
to its stable emergence.
Human adaptation to hierarchy appeared under two forms
(Pielstick, 2000), expressed in (i) human behaviours (Judge
et al., 2002), and (ii) human preferences. In an informal
hierarchy, leaders and followers are defined by their in-
trinsic characteristics. For instance, leader effectiveness is
highly correlated with particular psychological traits such as
openness and extroversion (Judge et al., 2002). The second
form is formal hierarchy where leaders and followers are ap-
pointed by group decision. For example, groups confronted
by other groups in collective games explicitly elect and iden-
tify an individual as a leader (Sherif et al., 1954). We call
this form here institutional hierarchy to stress that it is sup-
ported by institutional rules, which are created by group de-
cision and actively enforced by monitoring and punishment
(Ostrom, 1990; Hurwicz, 1996). The emergence of informal
or institutional hierarchy can both be explained by the fact
that they reduce costs of organisation (Powers and Lehmann,
2014; Perret et al., 2017). However, institutional hierarchies
are surprisingly pervasive in modern societies, given that
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they carry additional costs in comparison to informal ones.
A key to this puzzle lies in the particularity of institutions
which allow humans to hand-tune their behaviours, e.g. by
designating a single leader, in comparison to informal hier-
archies in which leaders emerge through blind evolutionary
processes. However, it remains unclear whether this differ-
ence could drive the appearance of institutional hierarchies.
Currently, independent explanations for the evolution of
informal and institutional hierarchy have been provided
(Powers and Lehmann, 2014; Perret et al., 2017), but there
is no model that investigates the competition between these
two forms of social organisation. To fill this gap, we first
investigate if the single-leader model found in institutional
hierarchy facilitates group decision-making, i.e. leads to
shorter coordination times. Second, we evaluate whether
this benefit is sufficient to lead to the evolution of cultural
preferences toward institutional hierarchy despite the addi-
tional costs of maintaining the institution. To do so, we de-
scribe group decision-making using an opinion-formation
model (Castellano et al., 2009) that simulates a sequence
of discussions between individuals, and has been shown
to reflect the organisational advantage brought by leaders
(Gavrilets et al., 2016). We define leaders and followers by
their capacity to influence others, and analyse the effect of
the number of leaders on the time a group spends to reach
consensus. We then integrate this model into an evolutionary
model where the time spent to reach consensus is translated
into the cost of organising collective tasks. The model simu-
lates a population structured around patches where individ-
uals organise and carry out a collective action, which pro-
duces additional resources. Individuals can choose between
informal social organisation where leaders and followers are
defined by individuals’ characteristics, or institutional social
organisation where leaders and followers are defined by the
institution. Our results show that in comparison to informal
hierarchy, hierarchy with a single leader reduces (i) the con-
sensus time, (ii) the variation in the consensus time, and (iii)
the increase in consensus time as group size increases. We
demonstrate that individuals evolve cultural preferences to-
wards institutional hierarchy because it provides a greater
organisational advantage than informal hierarchy, and re-
duces the detrimental effect of group size and inequality on
the time spent to organise collective actions.
The effect of the number of leaders on group
decision-making
We define social organisation by the proportion of leaders
and followers present in a patch. This ranges from a perfect
egalitarian organisation described by all individuals being
followers or leaders, to the most hierarchical organisation
with one leader and the rest of the group as followers. We
define political organisation as the process by which lead-
ers and followers are defined. The political organisation of
a group can either be informal, i.e. leaders and followers
are defined by default by individual characteristics, or insti-
tutional, i.e. leaders and followers are defined by group de-
cision (Hurwicz, 1996). It is worth noting that we constrain
an institutional group to be a hierarchy, but a group can have
an informal political organisation with either an egalitarian
or hierarchical social organisation.
Model definition
We develop an opinion-formation model to simulate group
decision-making based on previous work (Deffuant et al.,
2000; Perret et al., 2017). It is an individual-based model
which consists of a sequence of discussions between indi-
viduals until their opinions are close enough i.e. the group
has reached a global consensus. Opinion-formation mod-
els are well-known tools to study social dynamics (Castel-
lano et al., 2009), and have been shown to reflect the ben-
efit of leaders on group decision-making (Gavrilets et al.,
2016; Perret et al., 2017). Individuals are described by an
opinion x, and a value of influence α. These are both con-
tinuous values defined on [0,1]. The trait α represents the
influence of an individual and affects (i) the capacity of one
individual to modify the opinion of another individual to-
wards its own opinion, (ii) the reluctance of an individual to
change its opinion, and (iii) the probability that an individual
talks to other individuals. These three traits, i.e. persuasive-
ness, stubbornness and talkativeness, are highly correlated
in leaders personalities (Judge et al., 2002) and are the key
factors in explaining how leaders reduce time to reach con-
sensus (Gavrilets et al., 2016). Individuals can have one of
two profiles: a leader l = 1 with a high influence value αl,
or a follower l = 0 with a low influence value αf , where
αl > αf .
The opinion x is randomly generated at the beginning of
the opinion formation. At each time-step, there is a discus-
sion event where one speaker talks to Nl listeners to bring
the followers’ opinion closer to its own. The probability P
of an individual i to be chosen as a speaker u is an increasing
function of its α value as follows:
Pi(t) =
(αi(t))
k∑N
n=1(αn(t))
k
. (1)
In the simulations we chose k = 4 so that in a group of large
size i.e. 1000 individuals, with the most extreme hierarchy
(one leader with maximum influence, N − 1 followers with
minimum influence), the probability that a leader is chosen
as a speaker is close to 90%. The speaker talks with Nl
listeners randomly sampled within the other individuals in
the group. This limit on the number of listeners models time
constraints, and cognitive constraints of human brains (Dun-
bar, 1992). We assume that every individual can be chosen
as a listener, i.e. the social network is a complete network,
in order to avoid explicitly modelling the network structure
and to keep the model tractable. We also consider that indi-
viduals interactions are not limited to individuals with close
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Figure 1: Effect of number of leaders on decision-making.
(A,B) Mean consensus time t∗ as a function of number of
leaders in a group of 500 individuals (C.) Mean consensus
time t∗ as a function of number of leaders and group size.
opinions i.e. bounded confidence, because this model de-
scribes a consensus seeking process where individuals are
willing to convince each other. During a discussion event,
a listener v updates its preference to a value x′v following
the equation below, where v represents the listener and u the
speaker:
x′v = xv + (αu − αv)(xu − xv). (2)
We assume that the position of speaker gives a slight in-
fluential advantage over the listeners. Therefore, the min-
imum difference of influence αu − αv is set to a positive
low value, here 0.01. This assumption is necessary to avoid
a systematic convergence of the preferences towards the in-
dividual with the highest α, a phenomenon not observed in
real life. The individuals repeat the previous step until con-
sensus is reached, i.e. the standard deviation of the prefer-
ences x is less than a threshold xθ. The number of discussion
events that occurred to reach consensus is called the consen-
sus time, t∗.
Analysis
We use the opinion-formation model to investigate the dif-
ference in consensus time between hierarchy with a single
leader and multiple leaders. Because of this heterogeneity,
we use numerical simulations to analyse the model. The de-
fault parameters are for the consensus threshold fθ = 0.05,
the number of listeners Nl = 50, the influence of leaders
αl = 0.75 and the influence of followers αf = 0.25. The
results presented are the mean across 1000 replicates. The
error bars represent the standard error from the mean.
Figure 1.A confirms that hierarchy (i.e. a small number of
leaders) provides an organisational advantage by reducing
the consensus time. Figure 1.B shows that (i) the presence
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Figure 2: Density distribution of individual opinion as a
function of number of discussion events for different num-
ber of leaders: from top to bottom 0, 1, 2, 10. For illustra-
tion, the difference between the opinions of leaders are set
to be maximum and equidistant.
of a single leader reduces the average consensus time com-
pared to multiple leaders, and (ii) the presence of a single
leader assures a consistently lower consensus time (shown
by the low variance). The presence of two leaders provides
a variable advantage, which ranges from the same result as
the single leader to the result from a group without a leader.
As the number of leaders increases, the time to consensus
increases while the variability decreases. Finally, Figure
1.C shows that the rate of increase of consensus time grows
more slowly with group size when the number of leaders is
smaller. In other words, the benefit of single leader increases
with group size.
Figure 2 illustrates the opinion formation and the effect of
the number of leaders on group decision-making. First, we
see that in the absence of leaders, or with a single leader, in-
dividuals’ opinions slowly and consistently converge. The
presence of a single leader speeds up this process as the
leader quickly convinces the majority of the group. The
presence of multiple leaders creates a more heterogeneous
pattern of convergence. The presence of two leaders results
in the majority switching from one leader to another: leaders
alternatively convince individuals from the group but nei-
ther leader has enough followers to reach consensus. When
more than two leaders are present, the majority of opinion
fluctuates between the different leaders. In both cases, lead-
ers’ stubbornness slows convergence of leaders towards the
others, which in turn slows down the whole process. To
conclude, hierarchy with a single leader clearly provides a
benefit to group organisation which is (i) stronger, (ii) more
constant, and (iii) more resistant to group size increase than
multiple leaders. Thus, a slight change in the number of
leaders can have a drastic effect on group organisation.
An evolutionary model of political
organisation
We now develop an evolutionary model to investigate if the
benefit of single leader hierarchy is sufficient to lead to the
evolution of cultural preferences towards institutional hier-
archy. Individuals carry two evolving traits: their social per-
sonality s and their preference for political organisation h.
The trait s represents the intrinsic personality of an indi-
vidual in a social interaction (e.g. talkativeness, boldness,
charisma) and can be either dominant s = 1, or compliant
s = 0. It defines an individual’s influence α in informal or-
ganisation, and the probability to be chosen as a leader in
institutional organisation. The trait h represents the prefer-
ence in terms of political organisation of an individual: 0
represents a preference for informal organisation, and 1 a
preference for institutional organisation. In addition, indi-
viduals are described by a value of influence α as described
previously. The influence is either defined by an individ-
ual social personality s in an informal hierarchy, or by their
assigned individual social position in institutional hierarchy
(explained below). The initial values of the social person-
ality of individuals, s, are randomly generated. The initial
values of preference for political organisation h are set to
0 to represent the initial absence of institutions. The two
traits s, h carried by individuals are transmitted vertically
from parent to offspring, e.g. by social learning as is com-
mon in hunter-gatherer groups (Hewlett et al., 2011). They
mutate following a mutation rate of µ. As these traits are
assumed to be at least partly cultural, the mutation rate is
higher than for a classical genetic trait. When a mutation
occurs, the trait value is flipped.
Life cycle and social traits We consider an island model
with a population of individuals that is subdivided into a fi-
nite number of patches Np (Wright, 1931). The life cycle
consists of discrete and non-overlapping generations as fol-
lows:
1. Individuals decide whether to create an institutional hier-
archy and appoint a leader; or defaults to an informal or-
ganisation where leaders and followers roles are defined
by individuals’ personality s. Individuals creating an in-
stitutional hierarchy pay a cost ch.
2. Individuals play a decision-making game on their patch
as defined above (equations 1, 2). The time taken to reach
consensus is translated into an opportunity cost of organ-
isation (equation 3).
3. After consensus is reached, all individuals on a patch take
part in a collective task which produces an amount of ex-
tra resource, discounted by the cost of organisation (equa-
tion 4).
4. The resource obtained from the collective task is dis-
tributed among all individuals on the patch. Leaders get
a surplus of resources modulated by a parameter d which
modulates the inequality between leaders and followers
(equation 5)
5. Individuals produce a number of offspring drawn from a
Poisson distribution, with the mean determined by the re-
sources received (equation 6)
6. All individuals of the previous generation perish.
7. Offspring migrate with a fixed probability m. Migrating
individuals enter a patch chosen at random from the pop-
ulation (excluding their natal patch).
Political organisation Each group within a patch is de-
fined by a political organisation h∗. At the beginning of each
generation, individuals decide if they want to design an insti-
tutional hierarchy and appoint a leader (h∗ = 1); this occurs
if the majority of individuals in the group have a preference
toward institutional hierarchy i.e. 1Nj(t)
∑Nj(t)
i hij(t) >
0.5. In the absence of institutions (h∗ = 0), a group is or-
ganised by default as an informal hierarchy.
In an institutional hierarchy, one single leader is randomly
selected from the individuals with dominant personality s =
1 and its influence is set to αl. The rest of the individuals
within the patch adopt a follower profile and their influences
are set to αf (independently of their social personality). In
an informal hierarchy, an individual’s influence α is defined
by its social personality with αl for dominant individuals
s = 1 and αf for compliant individuals s = 0. In order
to be sustainable, institutions require resources to monitor
individuals and punish transgressors (Ostrom, 1990). Thus,
individuals creating an institutional hierarchy pay a cost ch.
Organisation by decision-making Once individuals have
chosen their political organisation, they organise a collec-
tive task through group decision-making as described above.
The consensus time is translated into a cost of organisation:
Coj(t) = t
∗
jCt (3)
The cost of organisation comes from the time dedicated to
organisation instead of carrying out the actual task – groups
that take too long to reach a decision may lose resources
or pay other opportunity costs. This cost is modulated by
Ct, which is a parameter representing the time constraint on
decision making and depends of the limitation of time on
the task, for instance, the speed of depletion of resources
or the need to build defences before an enemy arrives. We
consider here that the final decision reached has no effect on
the benefit produced by the collective task – the benefit is
only affected by the time taken to reach consensus.
Collective task At each generation, individuals take part
in a collective task and produce additional resources Bj(t):
Bj(t) =
βb
1 + e−γb(Nj(t)−bmid)
− Coj(t). (4)
The collective task simulates the numerous cooperative tasks
realised during the lifetime of an individual. It can encom-
pass many actions such as hunting of large game or construc-
tion of an irrigation system. The benefit is calculated from
a sigmoid function described by βb, bmid and γb, respec-
tively the maximum, the group size at the sigmoid’s mid-
point, and the steepness of the increase in the benefit induced
by additional participants. We assume economy of scale
in which additional participants increase the benefit super-
linearly (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2001). But as is standard
in micro-economic theory, we also make the conservative as-
sumption that the benefit of the collective task eventually has
diminishing marginal returns which overcomes the economy
of scale because of other limiting factors (Foster, 2004).
Distribution of resources The resources produced by the
collective task are distributed between the individuals on a
given patch. The share of an individual, pij(t), is then equal
to:
pij(t) =
1 + li(t)d∑Nj
i=1(1 + li(t)d)
. (5)
Leaders (l = 1) receive a surplus of resources modulated
by the level of ecological inequality d. For d = 0, the
distribution within a patch is egalitarian and the influence
of individuals does not affect the share of each individual.
Such a scenario is close to that observed in societies of pre-
Neolithic hunter-gatherers. For d = 1, leaders receive twice
the amount a follower receives. It is assumed for simplic-
ity that d is the same for all patches, and is determined for
example by the state of technology, e.g. food storage and
military technologies.
Reproduction After receiving their share of the additional
resources, individuals have a number of offspring sampled
from a Poisson distribution centred on the individual fitness,
w. The fitness of individual i on patch j at time t is described
by the following equation, where Nj(t) is the total number
of individual on patch j:
wij(t) =
ra
1 +
Nj(t)
K
+ rbij(t)− chh∗j − cnsij . (6)
The fitness of an individual is the sum of an intrinsic growth
rate ra limited by the carrying capacity K, and additional
growth rate resulting from the extra resources produced by
the collective task, rbij(t). The fitness of individuals with
institutional organisation is discounted by a cost of institu-
tion ch, which represents the cost to monitor and enforce
the institutional rule. The fitness of dominant individuals
is discounted by a cost of negotiation cn which represents
the extra time and resources that an individual with domi-
nant personality allocates to persuade others. The additional
growth rate rbij(t) is calculated as follows:
rbij(t) = βr(1− e−γr(Bj(t)pij(t))). (7)
The term rbij(t) is calculated from a logistic function de-
scribed by γr and βr, respectively the form and the max-
imum of the increase in growth rate induced by the addi-
tional resources. The additional resources are given by the
total amount of benefit, Bj(t), multiplied by the share the
individual receives, pij(t). The increase of the growth rate
follows a logistic relation because of the inevitable presence
of other limiting factors. After reproduction, offspring indi-
viduals migrate with a probability equal to a fixed migration
rate m. Migrating individuals enter a patch chosen at ran-
dom from the population (excluding their natal patch).
Analysis
We use this model to answer the following question: Can
the organisational benefit of single leader hierarchy lead to
a transition from informal to institutional organisation de-
spite the additional cost of institutions? Because of the non-
linearities of the model, which result from the interactions
of all of the variables, we analyse it using replicated numer-
ical simulations. We focus on the effect of the following
parameters: (i) the level of ecological inequality d (ii) the
cost of institution Ch and (iii) the time constraint Ct. The
default parameters used in the simulations, unless otherwise
specified, are Np = 50, Nj(0) = 20, K = 20, ra = 2,
βb = 10000, γb = 0.005, bmid = 250, βr = 3, γr = 0.05,
µm = 0.01 and m = 0.05. These parameters are chosen
in order to allow the transition between tribe size (50 to 100
individuals) to chiefdom size (1000 individuals). The de-
fault parameters for the group decision-making are the same
as previously. Finally, we want to allow for hierarchy even
when the political organisation is informal. To do so, we
choose a high cost of negotiation CN which limits the evo-
lution of too many leaders and allows relatively stable infor-
mal hierarchy. The results presented are the mean across 32
replicates when the result is as a function of generations; and
across 32 replicates and 5000 generations when the results
are as a function of a parameter. Where the result is de-
scribed as a mean, it is the mean value across patches. The
error bars represent the standard error from the mean and are
not represented when they are too small to be visible (< 5%
of the maximum value).
Figure 3 demonstrates that for a moderate cost of institu-
tion, individual preferences evolve towards institutional hi-
erarchy and thus, most of groups switch from informal to
institutional hierarchy. Groups have in average only slightly
more than 50% of individuals with preference toward insti-
tutional hierarchy because having any proportion above 50%
has the same effect on political organisation and therefore
the fitness of all individuals within the group. The small pro-
portion of groups with informal hierarchy are explained by
the cost of the institution and random mutations in individ-
ual’s preferences, which can lead some groups to temporar-
ily switch back to informal hierarchy. The prevalence of
institutional hierarchy remains stable for long period (5000
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generations). Figure 4 shows that the total amount of re-
sources produced and thus the group size increases through
time. The cost of organisation also increases but remains
low enough so that a large group provides more resources
than a small group. Figure 4 shows that two increases in
production and group size happen. The first corresponds to
the emergence of informal hierarchy, and the second to the
subsequent emergence of institutional hierarchy. This result
and the results presented in Figure 5 demonstrate that insti-
tutional hierarchy allows a higher production and a larger
group size. This is because a group with institutional hierar-
chy has (i) a lower cost of organisation and, (ii) a larger pro-
duction of surplus resources due to the larger size they reach.
When both types of organisation are allowed, groups reach
an intermediate size and productivity because of the cost of
institution and the presence of a minority of small groups
with informal hierarchy. To summarise, groups developing
institutional hierarchy strongly reduce their cost of organi-
sation. They grow larger, which improves their productiv-
ity, while hierarchy limits the increase in the cost of organ-
isation. As a consequence, these groups export a greater
number of migrants, who carry their cultural preferences for
institutions to other groups, leading to the global spread of
institutions.
Figure 6 shows that an increase in the cost of institution
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Ch.
Ch reduces the proportion of institutional hierarchy and the
average group size. This result is explained by the high cost
of institution overcoming the benefit brought by institutional
hierarchy. However, institutional hierarchy still evolves even
for a moderate cost of institutions. Indeed, a cost of 1 means
that all individuals within a group need a growth rate twice
higher and thus, to produce approximately twice as much
resources to sustain the same fitness (see equation 6. More-
over, Figure 6 shows that individuals develop institutional
hierarchy even if it doesn’t significantly modify the average
group size e.g. same size between Ch = 1 and Ch = 2. This
is explained by single leader hierarchy providing a more
constant organisational benefit than the multiple leaders of
informal hierarchy. Figure 7.A shows that a larger propor-
tion of groups develop institutional hierarchy when the time
constraint on the decision making Ct is high e.g. a time
limited task such as warfare. This is because the shorter
consensus time brought by single leader hierarchy has more
consequences on the absolute group production.
Figure 7.B shows that a higher proportion of groups de-
velop institutional hierarchy when the level of ecological in-
equality d is higher. This result is explained by Figure 8
which shows that the benefit provided by institutional hier-
archy persists even under high inequality. On the contrary,
Figure 8.A shows that in an informal organisation, an in-
crease in the level of inequality leads to an increase in the
number of leaders. This results in a collapse of hierarchy,
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(B) mean group size as a function of the level of ecological
inequality d.
a high cost of organisation and smaller group size (Figure
8.B). This difference in the effect of inequality is explained
by institutional hierarchy having only one expressed leader
even if multiple individuals want to be leaders. In addition,
only one individual attains the status of leader and hence
receives a surplus of resources, which ultimately limits the
increase in number of dominant individuals.
Discussion
Human social hierarchy can be formed because individuals
act as leaders and followers, i.e. informal hierarchy, or be-
cause certain individuals are chosen as leaders and follow-
ers, i.e. institutional hierarchy. But why do human groups
create costly institutional hierarchies if hierarchy already
emerges naturally from individual behaviours? The key dif-
ference is that single leaders can appear in institutional hier-
archy designed by group decision, but are highly unlikely in
informal organisation shaped by blind evolution of person-
ality traits. Thus, in this paper, we have focused on the dif-
ference between single and multiple leader hierarchies and
have shown that institutional hierarchy with a single leader
reduces more (i) the consensus time, (ii) the variation in the
consensus time, and (iii) the increase in consensus time as
a group grows. Our evolutionary model demonstrates that
this difference results in individuals’ preferences evolving
towards institutional hierarchy even if this has an additional
cost. To conclude, group organisation is facilitated by hierar-
chy but is highly intolerant to multiple leaders. This partic-
ularity provides one possible explanation for the evolution
and wide spread of institutional hierarchy. To understand
how critical and general is this explanation, further work
should (i) explore more widely the model and its parame-
ters and (ii) use data to test the prediction e.g. compare the
cost of organisation in informal and institutional hierarchy.
The results of the opinion-formation model confirm pre-
vious work which shows that an informal leader with the
features defined here speeds up consensus time (Gavrilets
et al., 2016). This prior work showed that an increase in
the number of leaders slows down the consensus, because it
creates more stubborn individuals. Our result adds that mul-
tiple leaders also slow down the consensus, because leaders
persuade each others’ followers, creating conflict of inter-
est between a large proportion of the group. It results in
a more detrimental effect of multiple leaders on consensus
time, which is amplified by group size. Previous theoretical
work have investigated the emergence of either informal or
institutional hierarchy, but ignored the competition between
the two forms. Powers and Lehmann (2014) developed an
evolutionary model in which individuals favour institutional
hierarchy over an egalitarian organisation. Other theoret-
ical models have shown that a similar process can drive
the evolution of individuals towards leader and follower be-
haviours, thus creating an informal hierarchy (Johnstone and
Manica, 2011; Perret et al., 2017). We confirm and connect
these works by showing that institutional hierarchy can be
favoured over informal hierarchy because it provides addi-
tional benefit to group decision-making, in terms of consen-
sus time.
Our model predicts that institutional hierarchy evolves
when (i) group size is high (and so productivity and cost
of organisation are high), and (ii) inequality is high. These
predictions fit with the environmental and social changes ob-
served following the advent of agriculture. Agriculture cre-
ated a durable surplus of resources which increased produc-
tivity and inequality (Bocquet-Appel, 2011; Mattison et al.,
2016). However, our model also predicts that the produc-
tivity benefit of institutional hierarchies can be counterbal-
anced by a high cost of institutions. It is hard to evaluate the
costs implied by institutions, but it is worth noting that they
result mostly from the resources and time allocated to moni-
tor and punish individuals not complying with the rules, i.e.
here individuals trying to become leaders. Our model has
shown that institutional hierarchy limits the number of in-
dividuals aspiring to become leaders, and thus suggests that
the costs of institutions remain limited even in large groups.
It is worth noting that instead of competing, the two forms of
political organisation could have interacted and even facili-
tated the development of each other. First, the development
of informal hierarchy also leads to a higher group size and
higher inequality. Second, the influence of an individual is
in truth defined by both an individual’s personality and its
social position. Integrating a composite value of influence
in this model could provides more insight into the interac-
tions between these two forms of political organisation.
In this model, we have explored only one form of institu-
tion and one function of hierarchy. It would be interesting
to explore other types of institutions, such as those allowing
multiple levels of hierarchy, or restrict the number of people
involved in the decision-making, as found in representative
democracy. Other functions of hierarchy could also be in-
vestigated, e.g. to enforce cooperation (Hooper et al., 2010).
However, it is worth noting that extending the model to inte-
grate the possibility of voting for more leaders would carry
similar qualitative results with individuals evolving a pref-
erence toward one leader. The presence of multiples leaders
appears only later in human history, with the rise of complex
states composed of multiple layers of hierarchy that con-
strain the behaviour of different leaders (Johnson and Earle,
2000).
Institutions are believed to be crucial innovations for the
emergence of human societies. We have shown here that one
of their major benefit is to provide humans with a finer tool
to modify their behaviour, which can be crucial for some
processes such as shown here with hierarchy. More than
a new innovation, the development of institutions marks a
transition in the dynamics shaping human behaviours: from
long and blind evolutionary process to fast cultural dynam-
ics.
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